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Cynical? Of course I am. How can you be a lawyer and not be cynical?
But a cynic? I am not a cynic. Cynics are the second-, the third-raters.
For the cynics I have nothing but contempt. There are rules, basic rules-
they may change, they may or may not be to your liking-but there are
rules. The cynics don't give a damn about the rules. '
INTRODUCTION
Supporters and opponents alike view Bush v. Gore2 as an extraordinary
decision dealing with an extraordinary set of facts. Indeed, defenders of the
decision often invoke a necessity defense: but for the Supreme Court's quick
action in taking and deciding Bush v. Gore, the argument goes, the nation
might have been plunged into chaos and anarchy. 3 The Court's extreme
solicitude for the statutory "safe harbor" available to the states, for example,
thus serves as a synecdoche for the safe harbor that the Court was compelled to
provide a divided nation. To many observers, however, the double Catch-22 in
the Court's cagey questions on remand concerning the basis for the Florida
Supreme Court's decision and timing-compounded by the Court's use of a
stay to help run out the clock (apparently without considering the traditional
judicial power to stop a running legal clock)-makes Bush v. Gore seem more
like undue enthusiasm for any port in a storm.
My thesis is that Bush v. Gore, though it may embody considerable anarchy
and chaos, actually is unexceptional. Through consideration of a small
sampler of the Court's decisions in the months immediately following its
notorious presidential election decision, we will see significant ways in which
Bush v. Gore was hardly atypical at all. This series of decisions about the
I LAWRENCE JOSEPH, LAWYERLAND: WHAT LAWYERS TALK ABOUT WHEN THEY TALK
ABOUT LAW 35 (1997). See generally The Lawyerland Essays,l01 COLUM. L. REV. 1730-
1796 (2001).
2 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
1 Richard Posner spins out a chaotic scenario of national crisis leading to Larry Summers
becoming the first Jewish president, to the horror of "semitophobes." RICHARD POSNER,
BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION AND THE COURTS 137-39 (2000) (discussing
who would occupy the role of acting president if the general election remained unresolved
on January 20, 2001). Throughout his book, Posner repeatedly claims that the nation faced
chaos and a major threat to order, thereby making it a close question, but, in his view,
justifying the Court's "rough justice." Id. at 147-49 (discussing whether or not the Supreme
Court's decision in Bush v. Gore constituted an injustice). Posner actually makes a
significant mathematical error when he forgets the Nader candidacy and other minor party
votes, leading him to concede too much to Gore; for example, he states that "if the question
is what percentage of the people who voted in the Florida election thought they were voting
for Gore, the probable answer is more than 50 percent." Id. at 88-89. He states further that
"the majority who cast votes thought they voted for Gore." Id. at 177. Hardly anyone has
attempted to defend the Court's radical innovation in what Posner described as the Court's
"tatterdemalion equal protection ground." See id. at 187 (addressing the alternative rationale
for hearing Bush v. Gore set forth in the Court's opinion).
[Vol. 82:699
COURTING ANARCHY
amount of deference due to other decision-makers reveals a majority of the
Justices that does not feel bound by constitutional text, precedent, prudential
restraint, or the votes of the populace. Neither the usual constraints of judicial
craftsmanship nor the messy processes of democracy act as significant barriers
before the march of an increasingly Imperial Court.
Though the current Court does mouth the usual shibboleths about its
commitment to upholding democracy-but perhaps not to following the
election retums4-its decisions disclose a new metafederal courts' approach. 5
This newfangled brand of carefree interventionism does not embrace those
excluded, or those who repeatedly have been losers within our flawed election
system. Instead-in cases large and small-the Court already is well along in
putting in place a series of default rules that favor those already ahead in power
and resources. This campaign nibbles away at the foundational premises of
both politics and law.
In the months after Bush v. Gore, the Justices mirrored that case's approach
over and over. They repeatedly asserted their independence from the usual
rules, as well as from the authority of more democratic decision-makers. The
overarching value in the new metafederal courts is that the Supreme Court, and
no one else, holds and protects "The Secret." The Court's pronouncements
about federalism, for example, no longer need to be anchored in text or
precedent. As long as the bare majority's choices are emphatic, the Justices
seem to believe that neither explanation nor attention to practical effects is to
be expected. Bush v. Gore turns out to be hardly atypical for the current,
counterdifficultarian majority.
To be sure, any new case poses the possibility of a "reconsideration of
4 See F.P. DUNNE, The Supreme Court's Decisions, in MR. DooLEY's OPINIONs 21, 26
(1906) ("[Tjhere's wan thing I'm sure about.... [N]o matter whether th' constitution
follows th' flag or not, th' Supreme Coort follows th' iliction returns.").
I I refer to "metafederal" courts not simply in the sense captured by Leon Lipson's quip,
"Anything you can do, I can do meta." A.A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law,
1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1230 n.2 (1979). As developed more fully below, what I am defining
as metafederal courts is prefigured in the current majority's state sovereign immunity
innovations. Underlying suppositions or overarching postulates are said to compel judicial
activism by Justices who concede that their decisions do not have support in the
constitutional text itself. At the same time, the Court makes and breaks the rules with
almost gleeful abandon. This approach is particularly striking when one recognizes that a
majority of the current Court not only attended Harvard Law School in the 1950s, but also
took the famous Hart and Sacks legal process course. See Laura E. Little, Hiding with
Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75,
133 & n.237 (1998) (observing that "most lawyers learning about federal courts in law
schools over the last forty years cut their teeth on the legal process model permeating Hart
and Wechsler's [casebook,] The Federal Courts and the Federal System," and noting that
according to other sources most of the sitting Justices took Hart and Sacks's legal process
class at Harvard during the height of the legal process mode of legal thought). Today's
justices would not be the first law school graduates to rebel against what they were taught in
law school.
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formalism."'6 Most of the time, however, the rules of the legal game as well as
the core assumptions inherent in speaking the language of law support-in
fact, celebrate-the claims that judges make in order to sustain the legal order
as they follow the law. We are awash now in a hot new debate about the
Court's legitimacy and authority-about how to deal with what Jack Balkin
aptly describes as rapid moves "from the positively loony to the positively
thinkable, and ultimately to something entirely consistent with 'good legal
craft.' 7 Exceptions tend to clarify boundaries. The core problem, however, is
not Bush v. Gore. A new imperium repeatedly proves willing to overrule the
rules, just as it cavalierly trumps the clear directives of the other two federal
branches, and even the states, if it may displease this Court.
Ambrose Bierce's definition of "precedent" seems even more apt: "a
previous decision, rule or practice which, in the absence of a definite statute,
has whatever force and authority a Judge may choose to give it, thereby greatly
simplifying his task of doing as he pleases."8  The current Court is less
constrained than even Bierce imagined possible, however. As we will see, in
their hands, no statute is definite. A majority proclaims its devotion to the
plain meaning of legislation-until they would rather not follow what the
statute actually says. Indeed, the current Court repeatedly abuses both the
telescope (for example, the abstractions of federalism) and the microscope (for
example, the nitty-gritty of federal courts, administrative law, and civil
procedure) whenever it suits its pleasure.
Among law professors, there has been much discussion about whether and
how to teach Bush v. Gore. It tends to focus on whether this decision adds too
much too fast to cynicism among law students, who often claim that judges
simply are result-oriented. A more troubling question turns out to be: how do
we teach a whole new range of metafederal courts decisions to our students
while attempting to instill concern for nuance, careful use of language, and
craftsmanship?
A brief survey of decisions in the months immediately after Bush v. Gore
illustrates the Court's incremental anarchic tendencies: this series of decisions
looks like the monthly offerings of a weird Outrage-of-the-Month Club.
Simply selecting one decision per month from January through June, 2001,
illustrates the glib unconcern among the Justices for the usual roles of other
branches, for the states, or even for everyday lawyering. Instead, we begin to
see a sustained effort to break down the public nature of government at all
levels.
Though the Court's decisions generally cruise well below the radar of public
6 ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 123-30
(1975).
7 Jack Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J.
1407, 1444-45 (2001).
8 AMBROSE BIERCE, The Devil's Dictionary, in THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF AMBROSE
BIERCE 187, 330 (1946).
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opinion-after all, the public, apparently, hardly noticed during the campaign
when candidate George W. Bush got away with calling Justices Scalia and
Thomas paradigmatic strict constructionists 9 -even the less frequently noted
cases we consider from January through June, 2001, are striking in their lack of
respect for governmental authority, as well as in their apparent delight in
ignoring or breaking the rules. The impulse of the Justices to undermine the
power, and even the legitimacy, of all other contenders is reminiscent of an
essential part of classic anarchist thought. There are many kinds of anarchy, of
course, and the term should be used with care.' 0 Let us first consider several
categories of anarchy that the Court itself has specifically decried in the past.
I. Two DESCRIPTIONS OF JUDICIAL ANARCHY1
A. The Anarchy of Rights Too Ardently Enforced
Underpinning the Court's rejection of many rights claims in recent years has
been a great impulse to identify, and then to claim to avoid, slippery slopes.
Anarchy is seen to loom at the bottom of each hill. In the realm of religious
freedom, for example, the camel's nose under the tent may be even more
prominent than are the ongoing contests over creches (with or without camels
in or near the manger). 12 In Employment Division, Department of Human
9 See, e.g., Laurie Kellman, Campaigns Revealed Viewpoints on Justices, CHATTANOOGA
TIMES/CHATrANOOGA FREE PRESS, Dec. 12, 2000, at Al; Michael McGough, Supreme
Speculation, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 1, 2000, at E-1; Fred Barnes, Bush Scalia,
THE WKLY. STANDARD (Wash., D.C.) July 5, 1999, at 16. See generally JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (discussing popular views, at least as measured by most
public opinion polls and by the historic unconcern of the America public with the judges
themselves as an election issue).
10 See, e.g., PAUL AVRICH, SACCO AND VANZETrI: THE ANARCHIST BACKGROUND 52-53
(1991) (detailing differences among four different groups of Italian anarchists).
1 The distensible invocations of the term "anarchy" by the Court are intriguing. There
were slightly over one hundred references to "anarchy" in a LEXIS search of the Court's
opinions done on December 3, 2001. Many concern the criminalization of anarchy and its
use as a basis for deportation. For example, attorneys Clarence Darrow and Edgar Lee
Masters fought a losing battle against Justice-to-be James C. McReynolds when they sought
to prevent the deportation of English anarchist John Turner in 1904. See United States ex
rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904) (defining broadly both Congress' power over
immigration and the meaning of being an anarchist). Another repeated theme is the idea
that "some forms of orderly regulation actually promote freedom more than would a state of
total anarchy." Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 546
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). The most frequent mention of anarchy, however, has been
in citations of Justice Brandeis's famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
485 (1928) (emphasizing role of government as teacher and deploring lawlessness of
government officials) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
12 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (allowing a creche as part of
"secular" display); see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)
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Resources v. Smith,13 for example, Justice Scalia's majority opinion denied the
Free Exercise claims of members of the Native American Church who used
peyote as part of their ritual. He explained the Court's rejection of decades of
precedent protecting religious belief and practice with the following words:
If the compelling state interest test means what it says, many laws will
not meet the test. Any society adopting such a system would be courting
anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's
diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress
none of them. 14
As Scalia had it (citing the earlier flag salute decision in Minersville School
District v Gobitis15 rather than West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,16 the flag salute decision that overturned Gobitis only three years
later), constitutionally compelled judicial tolerance of a multitude of religions
courts anarchy and therefore must be avoided.' 7 To a persistent majority of the
current Court, judicial enforcement of established constitutional norms itself
may present an anarchic threat.' 8  Yet efforts by Congress to enforce
(disallowing freestanding nativity scene).
1' 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990) (holding that states are permitted under the Free Exercise
clause to deny unemployment benefits following job loss because of sacramental peyote
use). See generally GARRETr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUs FREEDOM ON TRIAL
(2001).
14 Id. at 884.
11 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding a state regulation calling for expulsion of students for
not participating in the Pledge of Allegiance on account of religious beliefs).
16 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Gobitis and declaring unconstitutional state laws that
compel the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance).
'v It should be added that, beyond his holding in Smith explicitly relegating Free Exercise
claimants to the polling booths instead of the courts, Scalia has proposed another solution:
re-voting, unless plaintiffs present hybrid constitutional rights or can prove the bad motives
of the government actors they challenge. Dissenting two years later in Lee v. Weisman,
Scalia explained that the founders of the Republic "knew that nothing, absolutely nothing, is
so inclined to foster among religious believers of various faiths a toleration-no, an
affection-for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the God whom
they all worship and seek." 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992). This solution apparently is only
available for monotheists.
18 This is true in other doctrinal realms as well. Compare, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793 (1997) (refusing to interpret the Equal Protection Clause to confer a substantive right to
assisted suicide) and San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(holding that the Equal Protection clause guarantees no right to equal education if the
inequality is the byproduct of serving a legitimate state interest) with, e.g., Harper v. Va.
State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down a Virginia poll tax on Equal
Protection grounds); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (declaring a Virginia statute
barring interracial marriages constitutionally invalid). See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964) (declaring unconstitutional an Alabama legislative apportionment scheme
that was not reflective of the population); and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
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constitutional norms are perceived as even worse.' 9 Before we look with some
care at how sweeping a limitation Board of Trustees, University of Alabama v.
Garrett20 actually is, we ought to compare and contrast briefly another fear-of-
anarchy strand the Justices repeatedly have identified.
B. Political Questions and Constitutionally Compelled Restraint
Luther v. Borden,21 the granddaddy political question decision that the Bush
v. Gore majority simply and entirely brushed away, offers the most significant
early discussion of anarchy to be found in the pages of the U.S. Reports. In
construing the Constitution's Guarantee Clause of Article IV, section 2, Chief
Justice Taney explained that in some matters, in times of both war and peace,
courts were "bound to follow the decision of the political. '22 Indeed, Taney
proclaimed, "If the judicial power extends so far [as to allow judicial scrutiny
of decisions left by the Constitution to the political branches], the guarantee
contained in the Constitution of the United States is a guarantee of anarchy,
and not of order." 23
For the Court, the holding in Luther v. Borden had the added appeal of
sustaining the status quo against an upstart Rhode Island popular movement
that had been defeated years before the Court's decision-with the aid of state
judges and federal government muscle. But Taney's opinion also became the
locus classicus for the core political question idea that the Court is
constitutionally obliged to leave some matters to the political branches. In
Dred Scott, of course, Taney soon proved both inconsistent and tragically
unskilled in matters both of principle and prophecy. Seeking to avoid the
looming Civil War through aggressive judicial intervention, Taney's lead
opinion for the Court voided the Compromise of 1850 in the name of strict
construction of the Constitution-whose interpretation was to be the monopoly
(invalidating sterilization of prisoners on equal protection grounds).
19 See, e.g., Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(leading to the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which
in turn led to City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the enforcement of
a law prohibiting the government from burdening religious exercise is beyond the scope of
congressional authority as limited by the Establishment Clause)); but see Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (declining to conclude that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 abrogates States' sovereign immunity without explicit language to
that effect); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)).
20 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
21 48 U.S. 1, 40 (1849) (declining to interfere in a Rhode Island dispute regarding the
legitimacy of the state government because the issue was political, not judicial, in nature).
22 Id. at 43. It seems somewhat surprising that none of the self-proclaimed legal
textualists on the Court claimed, in Bush v. Gore, that Article IV's guarantee of "a
Republican Form of Government" ought to be dispositive in favor of the only Republican
candidate for the presidency.
23 Id.
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of judges. Taney argued that Congress unconstitutionally ignored the fact that
the Constitution permanently relegated blacks to non-citizenship as a matter of
national law.24
The relatively tepid public reaction to Bush v. Gore, even within the first
year after the decision, suggests that Taney greatly overstated his "guarantee of
anarchy" theme. With the benefit of hindsight, we surely know that judicial
intrusions into questions left by the Constitution to other branches do not
always produce anarchy. Indeed, despite the Justices' oft-stated fears, the
Court seems generally to emerge from public controversies about its role with
renewed credibility. For example, the plunge of federal judges into the
political thicket of apportionment decisions along with the demise of the
prudential elements of the political question doctrine hardly seem to agitate
anyone but politicians and their lawyers. Even claims of racial and/or political
gerrymandering, which we will consider briefly when we turn to Easley v.
Cromartie,25 do not seem to concern the general public much these days.
Moreover, the Supreme Court as an institution seems to emerge from each
major crisis into which it wanders with undiminished-and, generally, actually
enhanced-popular support. 26 There is, however, another form of judicial
decision-making that invites disorder. It enacts a new form, an inch-at-a-time
version of judicially-imposed anarchy.
At its base, the Court's end-justifies-the-means initiative reveals a lack of
respect for the decisions of the elected national political branches-or, for that
matter, for state decision-makers. Bush v. Gore may be widely thought of as
the paradigmatic case, somewhat excused or else condemned even more for its
explicit "this case and this case only" assurance. A sampler of other decisions
during the 2000 Term demonstrates, however, that neither the carefree
sloppiness about rules nor the temerity at the root of both the stay order and the
final opinion in Bush v. Gore is atypical. If government officials-or judges-
become cynics about the rules, this "breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. '27
But let's get down to cases.
24 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-05 (1857). See generally DON E.
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 323 (1978) (enumerating the premises of the
Court's argument in Dred Scott); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977).
25 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
26 This point is hard to prove definitively, of course, and Dred Scott serves as a powerful
counterexample. Nevertheless, politicians as savvy as the two President Roosevelts, for
example, discovered that, notwithstanding their personal popularity, taking on the institution
of the Court proved to be a significant blunder. See, e.g., infra note 132, at 254, 278;
Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 1721, 1758 (2001) (noting that the Court's reconsideration of some controversial
decisions in 1937 conserved its institutional prestige and helped defeat Franklin D.
Roosevelt's court-packing plan).
27 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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II. SEPARATION OF POWERS?
The current Court is on a seemingly muted but powerful rampage against
Congress. The constitutional dimensions of this ongoing campaign may be
relatively well-known, but a whole series of bizarre statutory interpretations
slip beneath extensive public notice. Last Term, the Court once again-and, I
will argue, more severely even than before-limited Congress' enforcement
power under the post-Civil War Amendments. As Justice Breyer argued in
vigorous dissent, the Court has begun to treat Congress as if it were an
administrative agency, without even affording it the deference such agencies
are supposed to receive according to the Court's precedents. 28 In the name of
its proclaimed commitment to honor the text of Congress' language, however,
the Court last Term took several giant steps to narrow the authority of both
Congress and those charged with enforcing Congress' statutory will.
I begin with a fairly detailed examination of Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett,29 the best-known case in my sample and
probably the most startling illustration of the current Court's authority-
grabbing propensities. Brief consideration of two decisions that sandwiched
Garrett-in January, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers30 and the paradoxical Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams 31 in March--offers additional compelling evidence of the Court's
commitment to narrowing severely the breadth of federal statutory language
and the protections provided by those in the other branches of the federal
government who were sent to Washington through the democratic elective
process.
A. Hardheaded-and Perhaps Hardhearted-States of Mind and Minds of
States
1. Equal Protection v. Positive Law: Protecting the State Fisc Is Enough
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,32 the Court
held that the enforcement power granted to Congress through section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not extend to using the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") to protect people with disabilities from
employment discrimination perpetrated by states. 33 Chief Justice Rehnquist
28 See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376-77 (2001)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the limited deference the Court affords Congress).
29 Id.
30 531 U.S. 159, 161 (2001) (construing the authority of the Clean Water Act not to
extend to regulation of abandoned gravel pits).
31 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (declining to interpret the statutory term "interstate commerce"
consistently with the term's broad constitutional meaning).
32 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
3 See id. at 374.
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actually manages to go even further in rejecting the results of democratic
processes than did the Court in the Alden trio 34 and in United States v.
Morrison.35 At first reading, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in
Garrett seems a predictable extension of what the Court's vigorous activism in
the name of federalism has wrought over the past half-dozen years. Since
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,36 the Court has wielded the Eleventh
Amendment and its purported emanations to transform sovereign immunity
into an impermeable shield protecting state treasuries. Simultaneously, the
narrow majority has chopped away with a vengeance at the power of Congress
to counter or supplement a very broad range of decisions by the states. 37 Like
judicial activism of a century ago in the name of liberty of contract, today's
New Formalism operates almost entirely within its own closed circle.38
Therefore, in Garrett, for example, Rehnquist merely cited a case from the
prior Term, Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, to support his sweeping
declaration that "Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article
1.,, 39 The phrase "of course" belies a bitter, ongoing five to four struggle over
3' Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that state sovereign immunity is not
limited by the Eleventh Amendment); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that the Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act invalidly abrogates state sovereign immunity); Coll. Sav. Bank v.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that the state
suit provision of the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act was not a valid abrogation of
state sovereign immunity).
31 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
36 517 U.S. 44 (1996). See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 1201 (2001); Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal
Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1331 (2001) See generally
Symposium, Shifting the Balance of Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2001).
31 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See generally Robert
C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation
After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000) (discussing the broad implications of
Morrison and Kimel for federal anti-discrimination laws); Judith Resnik, Categorical
Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, Ill YALE L.J. 619 (2001) (forcefully
criticizing the Court's categorical distinction of federal and local in Morrison).
38 For a discussion of an earlier era's virtually unfettered activism in pursuit of perceived
paternalism, see Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 249
(1987) [hereinafter Soifer, Paradox of Paternalism]. For discussion of the New Formalism,
see Aviam Soifer, Full and Equal Rights of Conscience, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 469, 470-74,
484-92 (2000) [hereinafter Soifer, Full and Equal Rights].
39 531 U.S. at 364 (emphasis added) (citing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 79). Kimel, in turn, relied
on the Eleventh Amendment trilogy from the bitter final day of the previous Term and on
Seminole Tribe for its claim of "firmly established precedent." Kimel, 528 U.S. at 79
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this peculiar doctrine of very recent vintage. In any event, the Eleventh
Amendment has become trump over all the powers vested in Congress by
Article I of the Constitution, to be trumped in turn only by what the Court
deems an appropriately "proportional and congruent" use by Congress of its
Enforcement Power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Like the majority's reliance on the Eleventh Amendment, 40 however, the
Court's severe limitation of the Constitution's broad enforcement power
requires neither specific text, nor attention to surrounding history, nor even
internal consistency concerning the constitutional reach of congressional
power. We ought to consider the 1860s: the Thirty-Ninth Congress surely
mistrusted the contemporary Supreme Court, an institution that recently had
given the nation the Dred Scott decision. 41 In the 1866-68 period, when the
Fourteenth Amendment was drafted and declared to be ratified, few
Congressmen--or their countrymen in the North-regarded the Civil War's
gruesome toll as a sacrifice made to vindicate state sovereignty or to protect
the states from the reach of the national government. Indeed, by the current
Court's reasoning, Dred Scott-which has never been formally overruled by
the Court-was clearly the law of the land until at least 1868, when the
Fourteenth Amendment was declared to be ratified.42
Moreover, because Dred Scott was not overruled by the Court and because
there certainly were not major Court decisions vindicating civil rights in the
decade after the Civil War, the current Court's approach suggests that all of the
civil rights acts passed by Congress between 1866 and 1875 must be of
dubious constitutionality. Congress gave substance to Fourteenth Amendment
rights through the Ku Klux Act of 1871, for example, without waiting for the
Court to lead, thereby directly imposing federal antidiscrimination law upon
the states.43 As Garrett illustrates, the current Court has devised an entirely
("Under our firmly established precedent then, if the [Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967] rests solely on Congress's Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in
today's cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers"); Seminole Tribe,
517 U.S. at 72-73 ("The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III,
and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal
jurisdiction"); Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 672; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. at 636; Alden, 527 U.S. at 730-33.
4 In Garrett, for example, the Court proclaims, "Although by its terms the [Eleventh]
Amendment applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State, our cases have
extended the Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their own States." 531
U.S. at 363.
41 See generally W.R. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS: CONGRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION,
1865-1867 (1963).
4 See Soifer, Full and Equal Rights, supra note 38, at 489-92 (discussing this point
briefly).
13 The Ku Klux Act of 1871 sought to enforce Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment
rights. Currently codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even the protections of this key civil rights
act that remain on the books extend well beyond the rights the Court had recognized by
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new series of steps to divide and conquer such congressional power.44 Three
of the moves are breathtaking.
First, the Chief Justice returns to the City of Boerne line of cases, claiming
that they "confirmed... the long-settled principle that it is the responsibility of
this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional
guarantees. '45 In Garrett, the Court's imperial noose tightens considerably.
Having switched the burden to anyone seeking to vindicate congressional
power, Rehnquist states that "the first step in applying these now familiar
principles"4 6 is to seek precise identification of the constitutional right at
stake.47 Because the constitutional claims of persons with disabilities rarely
reached the Supreme Court until recently, only one source comes to the
Court's mind to define the constitutional right: Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.48 Because the Cleburne Court purported to apply only permissive
lower tier "rational relationship" scrutiny to a claim of discrimination based on
the disabilities of the residents of a group home, Rehnquist then says Congress
clearly can go no further.49 Rehnquist thus reads Cleburne exclusively in
terms of its dictum. Even in this, Rehnquist compounds the bitter irony. He
fails to notice, for example, that one of the specific reasons given in Cleburne
for not applying heightened scrutiny on behalf of the mentally retarded was
that a legislative response, "which could hardly have occurred and survived
without public support, negates any claim that the mentally retarded are
politically powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the
1871. See generally I STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 591-653
(Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970).
4 This is reminiscent of what the Court did to eviscerate Reconstruction. See generally
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 41-85 (1997) (discussing The
Slaughterhouse Cases and other cases that severely limited the meaning and application of
the Civil War Amendments). For a somewhat detailed historical account, see Aviam Soifer,
Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916 (1987) and Aviam Soifer,
Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651
(1979).
15 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (emphasis added) (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at
519-24). It is not "long-settled" at all, however, but rather an ongoing debate. See, e.g.,
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
46 Well, "familiar" only since Boerne.
47 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
41 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (applying "rational relation" test to determine the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance prohibiting "hospital[s] for the feeble minded"). But
see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding a Virginia statute entailing
mandatory sterilization for mentally disabled women); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993)
(upholding a Kentucky law establishing disparate burdens of proof for committing
"mentally retarded" and "mentally ill" individuals).
41 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 ("Thus, the result of Cleburne is that States are not
required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled,
so long as their actions towards such individuals are rational.").
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attention of the lawmakers. '50 Garrett, on the other hand, simply snatches
away the very kind of legislative victory upon which the Cleburne majority
thus relied. In fact, Rehnquist entirely ignores what the Court actually did in
Cleburne as it skeptically applied the rational relationship test. That the
disabled plaintiffs in fact won the Cleburne case is nowhere mentioned. This
kind of selective misreading of a case's holding ought to-and would-
embarrass first-year law students.
Next, according to Rehnquist's majority opinion, employment
discrimination against persons with disabilities as practiced by states certainly
can be rational-and, therefore, entirely beyond the reach of constitutional law.
This is the conclusion of a spiffy new Arizona two-step. Rehnquist observes
first that "States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make
special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions towards such
individuals are rational. '51  His nifty next step is: "They could quite
hardheadedly-and perhaps hardheartedly-hold to job qualification
requirements which do not make allowance for the disabled. 52
Indeed, in case we missed it, Rehnquist offers a reprise of this move toward
the end of his majority opinion. He explains the unconstitutional burden an
overreaching Congress imposed with the ADA as follows: "[W]hereas it would
be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a state employer to
conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able to use
existing facilities, the ADA requires employers to 'make existing facilities
used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities.' 53 Stripped to basics, the Court perceives a stark conflict in
Garrett: it is "ADA versus State $$"-and the rationality of economic
maximizing and states' rights must prevail.
This choice between dollars and individual rights against a backdrop of
federalism establishes a simple, triumphant syllogism:
(1) It is rational for states to save money by refusing to make any
allowances for the disabled.
(2) The Court's equal protection analysis will accept any rational basis for
classifications-and even for discriminations-even if they clearly hurt
the disabled.
Therefore,
(3) Congress may not use its enforcement powers to reach employment
discrimination practiced by states.
Even in the early 1970s, when the Court began to insist that seemingly
arbitrary state welfare classifications did not violate equal protection, states
still had to offer as a justification more than some perennial and
undifferentiated interest in saving money. In Rodriguez v. San Antonio School
50 473 U.S., at 445.
51 531 U.S., at 367.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 372 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(5)(B), 12111(9)).
2002]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
District, Justice Powell summarized "the lesson" of these welfare cases to be
"that it is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional
rights in the name of guaranteeing [equal protection]." 54 The current Court
has insisted that Congress also lacks such rights-defining authority. Logically,
only the Executive branch is left-though President Andrew Johnson and the
presidency more generally were hardly darlings of the Thirty-Ninth Congress
that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment. The ironic result is that the current
Court seems to reject the creation of substantive constitutional rights entirely in
the name of guaranteeing equal protection unless. 55
But I wasn't going to talk about Bush v. Gore...
Under Garrett, Congress is now constitutionally disabled from enacting
forward-looking legislation that might affirmatively seek to guarantee
constitutional rights through the enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction
Amendments. The post-Civil War amendments are to be limited starkly to
matters of negative liberty. "Poor Joshua! ' 56 indeed. To get to this point, the
Court simply has arrogated for itself untethered authority to engage in second-
guessing Congress.
It is particularly galling that the majority grabs this discretionary authority in
the name of determining "the metes and bounds of the constitutional right in
question," after which "we examine whether Congress identified a history and
pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States against the
disabled. '57 But the way that the Garrett Court determines that Congress has
not sufficiently identified such a history and pattern provides its infuriating
final move.
The Garrett majority resorts to a Fractured Fairy Tale approach, reminiscent
of Goldilocks's method of assessing fitness, as it turns to the extensive findings
and record assembled by Congress in support of the ADA. If Congress noted
5' Rodriguez v. San Antonio Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
11 Three Justices also recently reiterated that "the Equal Protection Clause shields only
against purposeful discrimination: A disparate impact, even upon members of a racial
minority, the classification of which we have been most suspect, does not violate equal
protection." M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 135 (1996) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J.,
and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
56 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (sympathizing with the plaintiff, who was the "[v]ictim of
repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and
abandoned by respondents who placed him in a dangerous predicament and who knew or
learned what was going on" but was denied recourse by the majority). Another "Joshua":
Congress and the people they represent may seek to move forward, but the promised land
turns out to be a gated community. Those who own the place will find protection afforded
by the Court, but those who are newcomers are out of luck, even when Congress attempts to
give them an equal opportunity to enter. See generally Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition,
Formalism, and the "Free World" of DeShaney, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1513, 1513-14
(1989) (discussing the "moral obtuseness" of Rehnquist's decision in DeShaney).
57 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
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too many examples, as in the Violence Against Women Act struck down in
Morrison, its legislation is unconstitutional as too sweeping; if Congress found
too few incidents, however, the record is dismissed as merely anecdotal and,
therefore, constitutionally inadequate. What might be just right remains a
secret, apparently exclusively a matter of what porridge the Justices want for
breakfast.
Sometimes the Court almost playfully decides to knock clusters of
congressional findings entirely out of consideration just before assessing
whether there are enough of them. In Garrett, for example, in the course of
addressing the extensive record of numerous discriminatory acts perpetrated by
state and local governments and duly noted by Congress, the Court used a
grand non sequitur to wipe all local government examples away.
Discriminatory acts by local entities-normally actionable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983-were essentially made to disappear on the grounds that the Eleventh
Amendment has been held to shield states, but not their subdivisions. Thus the
Court transformed all of Congress' fact-finding about discriminatory practices
by cities, towns, counties and other localities into post hoc nothingness. The
Court seems to be unaware that the congresspersons who developed and passed
the ADA had no way to know in advance that the Court's recent expansion of
Eleventh Amendment barriers-to limit Congress' enforcement power-would
have fatal repercussions for congressional fact-finding that they completed
years earlier.
Most of all, the Garrett majority seems to fear constitutional duties imposed
on the states. The Fourteenth Amendment is often read as an attempt to
require states to do things. Yet as Rehnquist states for the Court, "[i]f special
accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come from
positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause. '58 Who could have
understood, prior to Garrett, that the Equal Protection Clause is clearly distinct
from positive law?
Startling as this distinction may be, it is consistent: it appears, within the
Chief Justice's dichotomous worldview, that states' rights must severely limit
or even eliminate federal authority to enact "positive law." When he was new
to the Court, Rehnquist wrote that the "Civil War Amendments to the
Constitution... serve as a sword, rather than merely as a shield, for those
whom they were designed to protect. '59 But in today's brave new world,
58 Id.
19 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974). If Rehnquist's statement in Edelman
might be considered mere protective coloration for an opinion holding that the Eleventh
Amendment was a barrier to protect state officials against federal court remedies,
Rehnquist's unanimous opinion in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) found that the
sovereign immunity barrier was specifically abrogated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Fitzpatrick simply cannot be reconciled with the Boerne line of decisions discussed supra.
In fact, Fitzpatrick is particularly inconsistent with Garrett.
In 1972, Congress extended the 1964 Civil Rights Act's protection against employment
discrimination to cover state employees encountering discrimination perpetrated by the
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Congress is not allowed any "moral ambition"60 that might stretch beyond the
narrow (or empty) set that entails the Court's miserly sense of enforcement
clause congruence and proportionality. Garrett illustrates, therefore, that every
state's familiar and even admirable desire to "conserve scarce financial
states themselves. Male employees of the state of Connecticut sued for money damages,
claiming that they had been discriminated against by Connecticut's retirement benefits plan.
The Court's equal protection doctrine regarding gender discrimination only recently had
moved to a somewhat serious rational relationship when Congress amended Title VII in
1972. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), which
established more careful intermediate scrutiny of gender-differential treatment, came four
years after Congress' amendment and several months after Fitzpatrick. Yet Rehnquist's
opinion for the Court in Fitzpatrick clearly allowed Congress to be far out in front of the
Court in its statutory efforts to protect civil rights and to do so with none of the fact-finding
specificity now required according to Garrett. For example, Rehnquist wrote:
There can be no doubt that [the Court's precedents have] sanctioned intrusions by
Congress, acting under the Civil War Amendments, into the judicial, executive, and
legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States. The legislation
considered in each case was grounded on the expansion of Congress' powers-with the
corresponding diminution of state sovereignty-found to be intended by the Framers
and made part of the Constitution upon the States' ratification of those Amendments, a
phenomenon aptly described as a "carv(ing) out" in Ex parte Virginia.
Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455-56. Indeed, in a manner quite inconsistent with Garrett,
Rehnquist went on to say:
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that
is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority
under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own
terms embody limitations on state authority. We think that Congress may, in
determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or
state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts."
Id. at 456.
The rational basis scrutiny employed by the Court in Reed (clearly the substantive
constitutional law backdrop the Court had established at the time of Congress' enactment of
the 1972 amendments, based on its section 5 enforcement power) turns out paradoxically to
be a mirror image of the scrutiny the Court employed in Cleburne. In both Reed and
Cleburne, the Court proclaimed that it was merely doing low-level scrutiny, while it actually
looked much more closely-and invalidated the state law at issue. The state of Idaho
invoked economic efficiency and administrative convenience as defenses in Reed, to no
avail, as did the state of Connecticut in its losing effort in Fitzpatrick. Yet, according to
Fitzpatrick, Reed in no way restricted Congress' section 5 power to extend protection from
discrimination far beyond the Court's holdings prior to the 1972 statutory amendments. In
Garrett, by contrast, Rehnquist uses the rational relationship rhetoric from Cleburne-rather
than its result-to make Cleburne's low-level standard of review a broad restriction on
Congress' power that is the equivalent of the broad deference traditionally allowed state
economic regulations.
60 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting A. STONE, LAW,
PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 262 (1984)).
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resources" 6 1 can trump.
2. "Our Own Human Instincts," "The Better Angels of Our Nature," and
"Those Disadvantaged by Mental or Physical Impairments"
If the Garrett majority opinion ends on a discordant positive law note,
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, joined by Justice O'Connor, begins on a
genuinely positive note of dawning awareness and of progress. Justice
Kennedy offers an important insight: "Prejudice, we are beginning to
understand, rises not from malice or hostile animus alone." 62 In fact, Kennedy
continues, "[Prejudice] may result as well from insensitivity caused by simple
want of careful, rational reflection or from some instinctive mechanism to
guard against people who appear to be different in some respects from
ourselves." 63
Yet Kennedy's concurring opinion follows the downward spiral of a
tragedy. After his significant opening act, Kennedy quickly establishes a
struggle in which we must be embroiled involving the conflict between "our
own human instincts" (that make people who are different from us seem very
unsettling) on the one hand, and "the better angels of our nature" 64 on the
other.
As our baser human instincts and better angels wrestle, Kennedy initially
seems to make his own preference clear. He admires the ADA, describing it as
"a milestone on the path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive society. '65
Perhaps unconsciously echoing Brandeis's Olmstead dissent, Kennedy
emphasizes that "law can be a teacher"66 and that the lessons law may teach
can be significant. Indeed, he proclaims sweepingly that "[o]ne of the
undoubted achievements of statutes designed to assist those with impairments
is that citizens have an incentive, flowing from a legal duty, to develop a better
understanding, a more decent perspective, for accepting persons with
impairments or disabilities into the larger society. 67
But there is a fatal flaw. We cannot live in a happy world of citizens
learning from law while societal progress is made. The Constitution demands
invalidation. Why?
The explanation seems anchored in Kennedy's insistence on reifying
sovereignty. Indeed, he is explicit on this point, describing the states as
61 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372.
62 Id. at 374.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 375.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. There seems to be something to Justice Scalia's undiplomatic charge that Justice
Kennedy can be "sententious." See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 704 (2001)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (decrying Justice Kennedy's stated satisfaction in his concurrence in
Garrett that the ADA will help promote a "decent, tolerant, progressive society").
2002]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
"neutral entities, ready to take instruction and to enact laws when their citizens
so demand. '68 Elsewhere Kennedy famously celebrated the genius of the
framers for their ability to "split the atom of sovereignty, '69 yet in Garrett he
recognizes only neutral states that properly may take instruction only from
their own demanding state citizens. There is no middle ground. There may
not be a federal legislative teacher.
In the absence of the precondition of "confirming judicial documentation,"
according to Kennedy, because "purposeful and intentional action [is] required
to make out a violation of the Equal Protection Clause," 70 Congress may not
impose money damages against the states to enforce "a new awareness, a new
commitment to better treatment of those disadvantaged by mental or physical
impairments. '71 Only judges are constitutionally reliable.
Upon reflection, the last quoted statement is more striking than it first
appears. Though Justice Kennedy began his concurring opinion with
references to "our own human instincts" and to "the better angels of our
nature," by the conclusion of his brief concurrence, he and Justice O'Connor
have begun referring to people with disabilities not as "us"-or even as "those
among us"-but rather as "those disadvantaged."
The struggle between human instincts and better angels has been resolved
conclusively. The states are "neutral entities." The Court must assure that
these sovereigns are not insulted by legislation that lacks "confirming judicial
documentation" of a broad pattern of sins committed by the states, which are,
after all, not actors themselves-even as employers-but merely empty
vessels, responding accountably to the wishes of their citizens.
"It is a most serious charge," Kennedy explains, "to say a State has engaged
in a pattern or practice designed to deny its citizens the equal protection of the
laws, particularly where the accusation is based not on hostility but instead on
the failure to act or the omission to remedy. '72 Because such a failure or
6s Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
70 Id. at 375. But see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2001) (assessing whether the state
satisfied its "obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment"); see also, e.g., Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (observing that allegations of "irrational
and wholly arbitrary" treatment, "quite apart from the Village's subjective motivation, are
sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis"); Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (finding no rational basis for, and thereby
invalidating, application of city ordinance to home for those with mental disabilities).
71 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
72 Id. at 375. In sharp contrast, the majority in Bush v. Gore appeared to accept the
petitioners' core claim that Stevens described as "an unstated lack of confidence in the
impartiality and capacity of the state judges who would make the critical decisions if the
vote count were to proceed." Bush, 531 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Defenders of
the Bush v. Gore decision sometimes have been explicit on this theme of a rogue Florida
judiciary. Thus, for example, at a March 1, 2001 debate about the case that I moderated at
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omission "does not always constitute" the proof of an adequately egregious
discriminatory pattern or practice, Kennedy claims they never will-unless
there is the "predicate" of "the documentation of patterns of constitutional
violations committed by the State in its official capacity. '73 If there ever is
such adequate "judicial documentation," of course, then the courts that provide
the documentation are, presumably, themselves available and able to remedy
"patterns of constitutional violations."
The "neutral entities" of the states, therefore, have little to worry about in
defending against federal concern to protect "those people," including the
group of "those disadvantaged by mental or physical impairment." The tragic
ending to Kennedy's concurrence now seems foreshadowed, if not
preordained-but it is a tragedy of a simple made-for-TV drama, only loosely
based on real life. Ironically, Justice O'Connor-herself a victim of breast
cancer-joins Kennedy in ignoring the fact that Patricia Garrett is a victim of
both breast cancer and state employment discrimination. Along with many
others Congress sought to protect under the ADA, Patricia Garrett surely ought
to have counted as one of "us," rather than facing callous dismissal within the
anonymous mass of "those disadvantaged."
Initial recognition of the ADA as a vital "milestone" established by
Congress "on the path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive society" is
rapidly transmuted into a millstone. Sisyphus comes to mind as the Court
identifies abstractions as "dispositive." States' rights concepts must shield
"neutral entities." "Those disadvantaged" cannot hope to move such an
elusive and yet massive barrier.
B. Why a Duck?
There is piquancy in the realization that the Justices were working on solid
waste when the Bush v. Gore fandango interrupted their labors. It has a more
pronounced kick when the Court proclaims its commitment to prudential
restraint in the very next decision handed down. We learn from Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the five to four majority in Solid Waste Agency v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers,74 that the Court's exceedingly narrow
interpretation of the reach of federal law is required by "our prudential desire
not to needlessly reach constitutional issues. '75 What is most striking about
the decision, however, is the Court's willingness simply to abandon a recent
Abt Associates in Cambridge, Massachusetts, former Solicitor General Charles Fried
maintained that this unspoken but widely known factor supplied the discriminatory motive
otherwise missing from the Court's equal protection analysis. Judge Richard Posner claims
that the Florida Supreme Court was "unreasonable," "butchered the state's election law,"
and "erred grievously." See POSNER, supra note 3, at 147-49. To Posner, "[w]hat is
important is recognition that interpretation can be a mask for usurpation." Id. at 113.
73 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
74 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
75 Id. at 172.
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precedent quite directly on point76 in order to carve away the reach of an
agency's jurisdiction-while also raising significant doubts about the reach of
Congress' power. These questions-which the majority claims compel it to
narrow the Army Corps's long-standing interpretation of its jurisdiction over
waters in an abandoned sand and gravel pit that are to be filled with solid waste
and that are home to over 100 species of migratory birds-otherwise would
allow an administrative agency to "alter[] the federal-state framework by
permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power. '77
As Justice Stevens's dissent makes clear, the majority's rejection of federal
jurisdiction protecting migratory birds-an interpretation of statutory language
that the Army Corps of Engineers adopted during the Reagan
Administration-is many decades out of date; it is also based on a remarkably
selective reading of legislative history and the Court's own precedents. The
majority offers an almost defiant refusal to attend to Congress' changing
policies regarding extensive federal regulation of waters, even when the waters
are not navigable. If unraveling the entire interpretive tangle is a bit too
complicated for our purposes, the gist of the argument boils down to a clash
between the majority's definitional approach, which is insistent on dividing
bodies of water from one another according to what type each is said to be
(thereby leaving many of them to be regulated, if at all, by the states or the
market), and the dissent's more flexible approach, which perceives waterways,
pollution, and migratory birds as interconnected national matters that Congress
may readily reach, regulate, and allow experts such as the Army Corps of
Engineers to administer.
Rehnquist first concedes that Congress has broad Commerce Clause power
and that Congress intended to reach "at least some waters that would not be
deemed 'navigable' under the classical understanding of that term. '78 But he
then marks the watery spot for future constitutional limitation. Rehnquist does
this by emphasizing the Court's recent decisions restricting congressional
power and by finding "plausible" a narrow interpretation of Congress' use of
the phrase "other ... waters" elsewhere in the Clean Water Act.79
76 See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985)
(determining that "the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a narrow reading of the
Corps' regulatory jurisdiction over wetlands was 'necessary' to 'avoid a serious taking
problem').
77 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173. Rehnquist added: "Permitting respondents to
claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the Migratory Bird Rule
would also result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power
over land and water use," and thus his reading would thereby avoid such "significant
constitutional and federalism questions." Id. at 174. Note that the mention of federalism
questions as distinct from constitutional questions seems a surprising-and revealing-
alteration of the usual rule concerning statutory interpretation that seeks to avoid only
unnecessary constitutional questions.
78 Id. at 167 (quoting Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133).
71 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 171 (determining that § 404(g)(1) should not be read
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Rehnquist expresses considerable skepticism in response to the argument
that the "Migratory Bird Rule" at issue falls within Congress' power to
regulate intrastate commerce that "substantially affects" interstate commerce.
That "millions of people spend over a billion dollars annually on recreational
pursuits relating to migratory birds" is hardly sufficient, Rehnquist maintains,
because the Court "would have to evaluate the precise object or activity that, in
the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. '80  The contrast
regarding the appropriate role of the Court could hardly be starker when Solid
Waste Agency is compared to Justice Holmes's great, sweeping opinion in
Missouri v. Holland, which upheld national regulation of migratory birds, via a
treaty, as a "national interest of very nearly the first magnitude."'8' Holmes
rejected the federalism arguments invoked on behalf of the authority of the
states over migratory birds as "some invisible radiation from the general terms
of the Tenth Amendment. ' 82  Rehnquist and the Solid Waste majority,
however, perceive "significant constitutional and federalism questions" 83 that
compel them to reject Congress' apparent wishes, as well as to refuse to defer
to administrative judgment. Fans of the comparative starkness of contrasts,
however, will want to consider the expansive view of the Commerce Clause
adopted by the five Justices who formed the majority in Solid Waste when they
reached another statutory interpretation, again considered against the backdrop
of the constitutional reach of the Commerce Clause, two months later in
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams. 84
C. The Binding of Adams: Expanding Final Arbitration, Dismantling
Exceptions, and Enjoining Ongoing State Court Proceedings
The Court decided in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams that an employee
was bound by a mandatory final arbitration agreement he had been required to
sign as a condition of his employment. Justice Kennedy's five to four majority
opinion holds that an exemption within the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act
to limit the meaning of "water" elsewhere in the Act). Rehnquist notes, "Twice in the past
six years we have reaffirmed the proposition that the grant of authority to Congress under
the Commerce Clause, though broad, is not unlimited." Id. at 173 (citing United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and going
on to identify some of the ways Congress' assertion of power would be constitutionally
problematic).
80 Id. at 173. The Court says it also would require a clear statement from Congress, id. at
172 ("Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of
Congress's power, we will expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result."),
though the Court only recently has imposed such a requirement, decades after Congress
passed the statute in question.
81 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
82 Id., at 434.
83 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S at 174.
84 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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("FAA") 85-exempting "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce"-did not reach the employment contract of a sales clerk who had
filed a state civil rights suit alleging employment discrimination. The Court
instead reads the preemptive sweep of binding federal arbitration to reach the
full extent of Congress' Commerce Clause power as construed after 1937,
rather than as understood in 1925, when Congress adopted the statutory
language at issue. 86 Moreover, reasoning backward from a canon of statutory
construction (ejusdem generis), the majority declares the obscure statutory
exemption in dispute to be so clear as to preclude attention to the legislative
intent, which quite clearly was to exclude employment contracts altogether
from legislation directed at commercial arbitration. Dissenting, Justice Stevens
points out that
[t]his case illustrates the wisdom of an observation made by Justice
Aharon Barak of the Supreme Court of Israel. He has perceptively noted
that the "minimalist" judge "who holds that the purpose of the statute
may be learned only from its language" has more discretion than the
judge "who will seek guidance from every reliable source." 87
If the Court is indeed "[p]laying ostrich to the substantial history behind the
amendment" in its interpretation of mandatory arbitration,88 an unexamined
additional federal courts aspect of the case is downright shocking. Kennedy
simply recites that Adams filed an employment discrimination suit in state
court and that the employer then requested and received an injunction stopping
the state court proceeding. Indeed, the District Court noted that there was no
Anti-Injunction Act problem. In his oral order, Judge Legge observed:
81 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
86 There was no mention of the Court's recent limitations on Congress' Commerce
Clause power that loomed so large in Solid Waste Agency. Morrison was not even
mentioned, and the only mention of Lopez was for the observation "that Supreme Court
decisions beginning in 1937 'ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that
greatly expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under that Clause."' Solid
Waste Agency, 532 U.S. at 116 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995)).
87 Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting A. BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 62 (Y.
Kaufmann trans., 1989)). Stevens continues:
A method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and hence
unconstrained, may produce a result that is consistent with a court's own views of how
things should be, but it may also defeat the very purpose for which a provision was
enacted. That is the sad result in this case.
Id. That "the Court misuses its authority," as Stevens charges, becomes even clearer through
Justice Souter's dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Souter carefully
attends to different phases in Congress' use of-and the Court's changing interpretations
about- its Commerce Clause power. He convincingly demonstrates that there simply is no
basis for what he describes as the majority's position that "exemption language is to be read
as petrified when coverage language is read to grow." Id. at 137 (Souter, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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I think it's clear from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Moses Cohn
[sic], that the Anti-Injunction Act does not prevent a federal court to-
from entertaining a petition to compel arbitration, and that's true even
though the underlying suit-the underlying dispute to be arbitrated is one
pending in state court.89
Contrary to what Judge Legge asserts, however, the Supreme Court explicitly
did not reach the Anti-Injunction Act issue in Moses H. Cone.90 Yet the old
hydraulic pressure of Our Federalism91 is notably entirely absent in the
discussions by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. This is no federal
civil rights claim in which deference must be accorded ongoing state
proceedings. It is mandatory binding arbitration, so even the views of twenty-
two state attorneys general must be sacrificed on the altar of the purportedly
clear language of the Sixty-Eighth Congress. Thus, in refusing to consider the
context of the FAA, and ignoring the testimony of the then-Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover,92 for example, the Court simply can embrace the
concerns of big employers such as Circuit City.
Indeed, the Court emphasizes the breadth of coverage by the FAA,
ironically invoking the broad sweep of Congress' Commerce Clause power to
freeze out the employment discrimination claims of a lowly clerk in a
consumer electronics store. To do so, Kennedy must stress and embrace the
more expansive meaning of Commerce Clause power through the Court's
19 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, No. C98-0365, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6215, at *8
(N.D. Cal. April 29, 1998) (original in lowercase).
I "We need not address whether a federal court might stay a state-court suit pending
arbitration under 28 U.S.C. § 2283." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 n.32 (1983). For a convincing critique of the practice of enjoining
state proceedings in the context of arbitration, see Jean R. Stemlight, Forum Shopping for
Arbitration Decisions: Federal Courts' Use of Antisuit Injunctions Against State Courts,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (1998).
9' See, e.g., Aviam Soifer & Hugh C. Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing
Reconstruction, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1141 (1977) (discussing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), which, in the name of state overeignty, required federal courts to abstain even in
civil rights cases for which they had jurisdiction, and noting aggressive use of the vague
judicial concept of "Our Federalism" to constrain federal courts, rather than abiding by
legislative directives).
92 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 127 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
[A]nother supporter of the bill, then Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, suggested
that "if objection appears to the inclusion of workers" contracts in the law's scheme, it
might be well amended by stating "but nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce." The legislation was reintroduced in the
next session of Congress with Secretary Hoover's exclusionary language added to
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interpretations that have changed significantly since 1925. Paradoxically,
however, the Court reads the sweep of the FAA as fully as possible-in other
words, as the Court read the Commerce Clause after 1937.93  But
simultaneously the majority insists on a static, narrow definition, in its
interpretation of the exemption for some employment contracts. To do
otherwise, and to require Congress, judges, and litigants to attend to the
particular understanding of the breadth of the Commerce Clause at the time
statutory language was enacted, would involve "deconstruct[ion]" that would
be "unwieldy. 94
The Adams Court also seems deeply paradoxical as it resolves a key
jurisprudential conundrum intertwined with Bush v. Gore. Courts apparently
do change statutory law as they interpret it. Not only is such interpretive
change legitimate, according to the Adams majority (composed of the same
Justices who constituted the majority in Bush v. Gore), but courts also must
wrestle with the question of whether an expansive view of FAA coverage of
contracts "involving commerce" extends to the FAA's exemption of workers
"engaged in commerce." In holding that the exemption does not reach this far,
Kennedy's opinion refuses to "take into account the scope of the Commerce
Clause, as then elaborated by the Court, at the date of the FAA's enactment in
order to interpret what the statute means now."95 Indeed, in viewing the
statutory exemption as static-while the statute's mandatory arbitration
coverage is seen by the Court to have expanded over time through judicial
interpretation- Kennedy offers a fine example of Thomas Reed Powell's
definition of thinking like a lawyer: "If you think you can think about
something which is attached to something else without thinking about what it
is attached to, then you have what is called a legal mind." 96
Small wonder that Stevens's dissent accuses the majority of utilizing a
"deliberately uninformed, and hence unconstrained" approach to "produce a
result that is consistent with a court's own views of how things should be," but
that "may also defeat the very purpose for which a provision was enacted. '97
This bizarre approach thus turns out to be a crucial element of the new role of
metafederal courts vis A vis the intentions of those who prevail through the
93 In fact, in contrast to Solid Waste Agency, the sole mention of the Court's recent
decisions limiting the Commerce Clause power is a quotation from Lopez used to make the
opposite point. Justice Kennedy determines that the Commerce Clause should not be read
in the narrow way it was interpreted in 1925. Solid Waste Agency, 532 U.S. at 116 (citing
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995), for the proposition "that Supreme Court
decisions beginning in 1937 'ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that
greatly expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under that Clause').
94 Adams, 532 U.S. at 118.
95 id. at 116.
96 Thurman W. Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40
YALE L.J. 53, 58 (1930) (quoting Thomas Reed Powell).
97 Adams, 532 U.S. at 133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 82:699
COURTING ANARCHY
electoral process and the commonplace rules generally used to resolve legal
conflict.
III. CIVIL RIGHTS REDUX
A. The Rules of Justice, The Rules of Other Virtues
The rules of justice may be compared to the rules of grammar; the rules
of the other virtues, to the rules which critics lay down for the attainment
of what is sublime and elegant in composition.98
Significantly changing legal rules will often significantly change civil rights.
After all, civil rights are enfolded within law, a kind of halfway house between
the personal and private on one hand, and the political and official on the other.
Moreover, changes in legal rules and concomitant changes in civil rights often
are to be applauded, even when it is the judiciary that leads the way. 99 If we no
longer expect neutral principles, however, we still may hope for relative candor
and consistency as our judges interpret constitutional phrases and
congressional language in the realm of individual and group rights. As
Alexander Bickel observed: "The Court should maintain itself in the tension
between principle and expediency."'' 00 A small selection of the decisions
handed down between April and June, 2001 suggests that our current Court
seeks to break the tension. This Court is extraordinarily willing to bend or to
alter the rules governing standard of review, equity, and summary judgment in
pursuit of other goals.
Only in part to suggest that I am an equal opportunity critic, I begin with
Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court in Easley v. Cromartie,'0' the latest
round in the seemingly perpetual legal struggle over the acceptable
apportionment of North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District. In one
sense, this fourth round at the Supreme Court level poses and answers a simple
question: Did the three-judge court below commit clear error when it found
that the North Carolina legislature used race to redistrict? After reviewing the
evidence in considerable detail, a majority of the Court says it did. Breyer's
opinion ultimately finds the motivation behind the redistricting to have been
predominantly political, 102 rather than predominantly racial. The lower court
thus committed clear error.
98 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 205 (Knud Haakonssen ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1759).
99 See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
67-98 (1965) (discussing role of judicial review for constitutionality); see also Charles L.
Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
100 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 42 (1962).
101 532 U.S. 234 (2001), rev'g Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 407 (E.D.N.C. 2000).
102 Id. at 241 (reversing the District Court's finding that the legislature's motive was
predominantly racial and not political).
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John Hart Ely masterfully decimates the Court's false dichotomy between
racial and political motivation, pointing out persuasively that both were very
much present in North Carolina and that it is impossible to separate them
enough to make a meaningful choice as to which is "predominant." 10 3 There is
no question that the Court's extremely dubious earlier opinions in this
litigation, beginning with Shaw v. Reno, 1°4 and in the ongoing dispute over a
majority-minority district in Georgia as well, 10 5 boxed the Court into an
awkward corner.'0 6 Breyer clearly needs considerable wizardry to get out of
that box, while somehow holding onto Justice O'Connor's vote. But to say
that the three-judge Court committed "clear error" seems to flunk any genuine
straight-face test. The moment that gives the game away most clearly is when
Breyer rejects the District Court's primary reliance on "evidence of voter
registration, not voting behavior."10 7  The experts who testified before the
District Court differed, of course. But it is startling that the Supreme Court
overturns the lower court decision based on what Ely decries as a racial
stereotype of its own concerning how African-Americans tend to vote. The
Court states that it is constitutionally acceptable that the North Carolina
legislature remained unsatisfied with the inclusion of a seemingly safe majority
of registered Democrats in the Twelfth District. Those doing the redistricting
could have relied on the assumption that white registered Democrats often
cross over and do not vote Democratic, while black Democrats reliably vote
heavily Democratic. Therefore, according to Breyer, "political affiliation
1"3 See John Hart Ely, Partisan Gerrymanders and Racial Stereotypes: Maybe We Should
Apply the Bizarreness Test to Court Opinions, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming July
2002) (manuscript at 12-16, on file with author). In Ely's view, political gerrymandering
should be unconstitutional, just as racial gerrymandering has been held to be. Id.
104 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Easley v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 121 S.Ct. 1452 (2001). 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (the case name was
changed from Hunt when a new governor took over in North Carolina).
115 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (holding that Georgia's redistricting plan
violated the Equal Protection Clause).
106 See Ely, supra note 103 (manuscript at 5-6) (noting that continued contortion of
redistricted subdivisions was "enough to challenge a Houdini"). This particular
constitutional law morass is traceable to dubious reasoning in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993) (accepting plaintiffs' standing and claim of a constitutional right "to participate in a
'color-blind' electoral process"). The Court compounded the problem in Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900 (1995) (suggesting that complying with Department of Justice requirements,
to implement the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, did not constitute a compelling
state interest). The Court's recent solicitude for the feelings of individual voters who desire
color-blind electoral processes contrasts sharply with City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980) (requiring proof that at-large voting system in Alabama was maintained for a racially
discriminatory purpose, and arguing that because African-Americans were not allowed to
vote when the system was instituted in 1911, the system could not have been put in place for
discriminatory purpose).
107 Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 244.
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explains splitting cities and counties as well as does race."' 0 8 Thus, according
to the Court, the three-judge court below-the judges all from North Carolina,
and all well-acquainted with the Twelfth District saga-believed the wrong
expert and were clearly erroneous in the way they found the facts.
A key target of Ely's critique is the majority's assumption that political
gerrymandering serves a constitutional end. He argues that "partisan
gerrymandering is more clearly unconstitutional than pro-minority racial
gerrymandering."'09 Without directly entering that fray, however, we might
simply note how much Easley v. Cromartie stands as a deeply ironic
counterpoint to Bush v. Gore. Cromartie plunges into issues that turn on the
intent of those voting, for example, while Bush v. Gore seems to mock such an
inquiry. Breyer does not even mention uniformity as a value. Rather,
Cromartie accepts-even celebrates-self-dealing by politicians who blatantly
seek to guarantee their own political futures. In contrast, of course, Bush v.
Gore rejected the efforts of the Florida courts to capture the intent of the voter
in contested ballots. And a guarantee of uniformity became the Court's central
equal protection value. "0
B. Losing By Winning
If there were a contest for the most preposterous decision of the Term,
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health
& Human Resources"'1 surely ranks near the top. This might be particularly
the case if nine people, chosen at random from a phone book, 1 2 were asked to
decide. Buckhannon's basic question is: Who is a "prevailing party" entitled to
attorneys' fees under federal civil rights statutes? The issue is simple, and the
practical implications are substantial. The Court's answer is entirely
untenable, however, and it suffers from the practical effect of needlessly
clogging the federal courts. And the main basis for the Court's decision turns
108 Id. at 252.
10 Ely, supra note 103 (manuscript at 26) (citing arguments he developed in John Hart
Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L. REV. 607, 612 (1998)).
110 "[O]ne source of [the vote's] fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to
each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.... Equal protection applies as well to
the manner of its exercise." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000). Later, the per curiam
opinion offered the assurance that "[t]he search for intent can be confined by specific rules
designed to ensure uniform treatment," but the Court left identification of those rules to
what might be called a "we know it when we don't see it" standard. Id. at 106. But see
Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999) (rejecting
statistical sampling technique to improve accuracy of census results derived from subjective
human reporting and accounting).
l 532 U.S. 598 (2001) [hereinafter Buckhannon].
112 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating that the time when a life is no longer worth preserving is not "known to
the nine Justices of this Court any better than they are known to nine people picked at
random from the... telephone directory").
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out to be Black's Law Dictionary.
The facts are relatively simple. West Virginia's state fire marshal cited
several residential care facilities for violations of a state law that required all
residents to be capable of "self-preservation."'" 3 This West Virginia law
clearly was inconsistent with the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968, however,
and it very possibly violated the ADA as well. Several owners of residential
facilities, as well as some of the aged residents, filed suit in federal court.
While the suit was pending, the West Virginia legislature repealed the statute
at issue, 114 and the state of West Virginia ultimately moved successfully to
dismiss the suit as moot. Then the plaintiffs, maintaining that their lawsuit was
the catalyst for the repeal of the statute, sought attorneys' fees as the
"prevailing party" under the relevant civil rights statutes.
By a six to five vote in 1994, however, the Fourth Circuit had become the
only Circuit to reject a "catalyst" theory, utilized throughout the federal court
system to define "prevailing party" under such statutes. In a per curiam
opinion, therefore, the Buckhannon Fourth Circuit panel affirmed that the
District Court was bound to follow this Fourth Circuit precedent.' 5 Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion embraces the Fourth Circuit rule and
holds that some judicial imprimatur is a prerequisite to being compensated as a
"prevailing party." For a party to have "achieved the desired result because the
lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct"' 1 6 will
not suffice. Rehnquist's majority opinion declares that this is because
Congress employed the term "prevailing party" as "a legal term of art.' 7
Instead of the Justices' recent and oft-declared devotion to the plain meaning
of ordinary language, the Court simply relies upon the seventh edition of
Black's Law Dictionary to discern the meaning of this legal term."18 Black's
Law Dictionary trumps the Court's own recent dicta, the views of all the
circuit courts except the Fourth Circuit, the statutory civil rights context, and
multiple precedents stretching back into the nineteenth century and carefully
marshaled in Justice Ginsburg's dissent.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurs but writes separately "in
113 Plaintiff Dorsey Pierce, who was 102 years old, had resided at Buckhannon for
approximately four years. She and two other Buckhannon residents could not get to a fire
exit without some assistance, which apparently was readily available. See Buckhannon, 532
U.S. at 623.
114 In fact, in the course of the litigation, the District Judge actually took the unusual step
of imposing Rule II sanctions against West Virginia for failing to disclose the pending
repeal.
115 See, e.g., S-I & S-2 By and Through P-1 & P-2 v. State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.3d 49, 51
(4th Cir. 1994) (en banc) [hereinafter S-1 & S-2] ("The fact that a lawsuit may operate as a
catalyst for post-litigation changes in a defendant's conduct cannot suffice to establish
plaintiffs as a prevailing party.").
116 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001).




order to respond at greater length to the contentions of the dissent."119 But
Scalia's method of distinguishing older precedents comes down to non
sequiturs such as noting, and thereby dismissing, a decision contrary to his
view because it was an equity case. 120 While Scalia is known to be a great fan
of the common law, he does not explain why identifying a precedent as an
equity case relegates it to the dustbin. Nor does he do a convincing job in
distinguishing numerous cases that awarded costs without a judicial
imprimatur. Moreover, it is striking to find Scalia insisting not on ordinary
language, but arguing instead that "[w]ords that have acquired a specialized
meaning in the legal context must be accorded their legal meaning." 121
Dissenting in a habeas corpus case at the end of the 2001 Term, Justice
Breyer deftly critiques excessive judicial reliance on texts in isolation and on
dictionaries:
Language, dictionaries, and canons, unilluminated by purpose, can lead
courts into blind alleys, producing rigid interpretations that can harm
those whom the statute affects. If generalized, the approach, bit by bit,
will divorce law from the needs, lives, and values of those whom it is
meant to serve-a most unfortunate result for a people who live their
lives by law's light.' 22
And Black's Law Dictionary seems a particularly unreliable anchor for
Supreme Court decisions. In a fine recent article, Ellen Aprill carefully
examines how law dictionaries are composed. 23 It turns out that Black's Law
Dictionary is compiled primarily of interpretations culled from the opinions of
state court judges. Its editors do not even purport to use the principles of
professional lexicography. Indeed, the preface to the sixth edition of the
"hodgepodge" that is Black's Law Dictionary concludes with "A Final Word
of Caution," warning readers that "a legal dictionary should only be used as a
'starting point' for definitions."' 124  In their debate over how to define
119 Id., at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
121 Id., at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).
121 Id., at 615 (Scalia, J., concurring).
122 Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2135 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by
Ginsburg, J.).
123 Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30
ARIz. ST. L.J. 275, 303-14 (1998) (examining "how [legal dictionaries] formulate their
definitions and on what the definitions are based").
124 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY iv (6th ed. 1990); Aprill, supra note 123 at 309. Aprill
states about the Sixth Edition that "[t]he current edition of Black's Law Dictionary is, as
Professor Mellinkoff points out, a hodgepodge of old and new, current and obsolete, without
indication of their current status." Id. at 306 (referring to David Mellinkoff, The Myth of
Precision and the Law Dictionary, 31 UCLA L. REv. 423 (1983)). Aprill summarizes her
argument about the judicial use of dictionaries to ascertain statutory meaning as follows: "It
gives a false sense of authority, precision, neutrality, objectivity, and certainty." Id. at 313.
See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
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"prevailing party," the Justices also contest the relative justice of their
conclusions and its effect on "less well-heeled"'' 25 advocates, in ways that
would not surprise any court-watcher. What none of the Justices address,
however, is the backlog of cases likely to result. After Buckhannon, unless
Congress acts to amend the statutes to make its intentions even clearer, even
lawyers who wish to settle with some attorneys' fees at stake must wait for a
judicial stamp of approval for their settlements. This hardly seems an
inducement for either efficiency or justice.
C. Neutrality and a Neutered Establishment Clause: Piercing the Veil of
Summary Judgment Law
At first glance, the Court's decision in Good News Club v. Milford Central
School 26 may seem a victory for freedom of expression, as well as the next
logical step in the Court's development of the constitutional importance of
viewpoint neutrality by public officials. A small school district in northern
New York State, given various options by state law, decided to allow a variety
of uses of school property for after-school activities. When the Good News
Club applied to run its program immediately after the elementary school day
ended, however, the School District determined that the Club's purposes were
"primarily religious" and denied them access. Both the District Court and the
Second Circuit upheld this decision, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that this case clearly was governed by two of its recent precedents.
127
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749 (1995).
For all the recent insistence by some of the Justices on the precision they claim to find in
dictionaries, they sometimes even fail to quote accurately the myriad dictionaries they use
and also misleadingly quote particular meanings without noting alternative definitions-
even when listed as preferred-that undercut their claimed definitional clarity. See, for
example, Justice Thomas's insistence on a narrow definition of "discrimination" in
Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 616 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting), discussed in Aviam
Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REv.
1279, 1315-16 (2000).
125 Compare Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 623 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court's "constricted definition of 'prevailing party,' and consequent rejection of the
'catalyst theory,' impede[s] access to court for the less well-heeled") with id. at 620 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (noting in response that "of course, the catalyst theory also harms the 'less
well-heeled').
126 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that the Milford school violated the Good News Club's
free speech rights when it excluded the Club from meeting after hours at the school).
127 The two cases in question are Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993), and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Also, Good News Club contains an unusual scolding of the
Second Circuit for its "remarkable" and "particularly incredible" failure specifically to cite
Lamb's Chapel. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 109 n.3. In response, Justice Souter's
dissent claims to distinguish Lamb's Chapel. See id. at 136-37 (agreeing with the lower
courts that the facts of Good News Club made it distinguishable from Lamb's Chapel). He
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According to Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, the parties agreed
that the after-school program in the public schools was a limited public forum.
Nonetheless, the Court decides that to exclude an evangelical Christian club-
that sought to appeal to elementary school children-was to violate viewpoint
neutrality. Indeed, as Thomas views the School Board policy, it perceived
religion as a tainted form of public expression. The School Board, on the other
hand, argued that the Club's activity went far beyond offering religious
perspectives, but rather involved prayer and other forms of religious practice
that made its expression "quintessentially religious."1 28 Thus, said the School
Board, to permit the use of public school space for such expression would be to
violate the Establishment Clause.
There is much to be said-and a great deal surely will be-about how
elusive neutrality turns out to be in the context of religious practice and belief.
Even parental consent for a program that takes place immediately after school
and offers treats as well as salvation to children ages six to twelve will seem
problematic to some. Thomas's sweeping diminution of Establishment Clause
protections does for that part of the First Amendment almost what Scalia's
opinion in the Smith peyote case did to pulverize most Free Exercise Clause
claims. In fact, Scalia would go further than the Thomas majority opinion to
diminish the separation of church and state.129 Scalia's concurrence perceives
surprising parallelism between the goals of the Boy Scouts, which include
emulation of President Gerald R. Ford, and the goals of the Good News Club,
which include emulation of Jesus Christ. 130 There is an insipid "leveling" in
the Good News Club version of neutrality. When religious worship and ritual
also argues that the Second Circuit actually had followed the test announced in Lamb's
Chapel. See id. ("The Court of Appeals... realized that the Lamb's Chapel criterion was
the appropriate measure ...."). Finally, he adds that Judge Miner, the author of the Second
Circuit opinion that Thomas decries, cited another opinion written by Miner that extensively
discussed and ultimately relied upon Lamb's Chapel. See id. at 137 n.2.
28 Id. at passim (using language in Good News Club v. Milford Ctr. Sch., 202 F.3d 502,
510 (2d Cir. 2000)).
129 Thus, for example, Scalia claims the case poses "zero" Establishment Clause issues.
Rather, he asserts, "Physical coercion is not at issue here; and so-called 'peer pressure,' if it
can even been considered coercion, is, when it arises from private activities, one of the
attendant consequences of a freedom of association that is constitutionally protected." Id. at
121 (Scalia, J., concurring).
130 Justice Scalia stated:
The Boy Scouts could undoubtedly buttress their exhortations to keep "morally
straight" and live "clean" lives [citing Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
649 (2000)] by giving reasons why that is a good idea-because parents want and
expect it, because it will make the scouts "better" and "more successful" people,
because it will emulate such admired past Scouts as former President Gerald Ford. The
Club, however, may only discuss morals and character, and cannot give its reasons why
they should be fostered-because God wants and expects it, because it will make the
Club members "saintly" people, and because it emulates Jesus Christ.
Id. at 124 (emphasis in original).
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becomes simply another form of speech, both the protections of the Religion
Clauses and the essential aspects of faith and ritual have been largely dissolved
away.
What is most startling for our purposes, however, is what Thomas's opinion
does regarding the procedural posture of the case. Because the School Board
prevailed on summary judgment in the two lower courts, it never got to present
its Establishment Clause argument. This does not trouble the Court. As
Thomas explains, the parties briefed the Establishment Clause issue
extensively and neither asked for a remand. The Court simply asserts-in
response to many examples of the possible significance that context could have
in this case, posed by Justice Breyer in his concurrence and by Justice Souter
in his dissent-that specific facts concerning the Good News Club in the
Milford schools simply are not relevant. Indeed, the Court both assumes some
facts and argues that "there is no evidence" concerning other matters integral
to the Establishment Clause inquiry.' 3' Simultaneously, Thomas ignores the
ways in which the summary judgment posture of the case precluded
development of the relevant facts. The Court actually observes that it does not
need to know, for example, "when, and to what extent, other groups use the
facilities."'' 32 The majority instead characterizes the Establishment Clause
claim as "a modified heckler's veto." 133 That interest-and the attention to
context upon which it depends-is simply washed away.
CONCLUSION
What are we to make of a Court that shows so little regard for the rules of
the game? How can we make sense of a series of decisions that seem so
blatantly incoherent? This is, after all, a Court that calls Congress names in the
process of invalidating perceived congressional insults to the dignity of the
states 134 and then turns around and insults the states and their judicial
131 In his dissent, Souter suggests that "the Court itself points to facts not in evidence,
identifies facts in evidence which may, depending on other facts not in evidence.., be of
legal significance... and makes assumptions about other facts." Id. at 129 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
132 Id. at 119 n.9.
3 See id. at 119 ("We decline to employ Establishment Clause jurisprudence using a
modified heckler's veto, in which a group's religious activity can be proscribed on the basis
of what the youngest members of the audience might misperceive.").
134 See, for example, Scalia's opinion for the Court in College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 690 (1999) ("Legislative
flexibility on the part of Congress will be the touchstone of federalism when the capacity to
support combustion becomes the acid test of a fire extinguisher."). See generally Ruth
Colker & James Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MIcH. L. REv. 80, 86-7 (2001) ("We are
disturbed by the Court's emerging vision in which Congress has substantially diminished
powers to conduct its internal affairs or to engage in factfinding and lawmaking that the
judicial branch will respect.").
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systems. 135 As we have seen, the current Court bounces back and forth, for
example, between reliance on ordinary language and insistence that language
must be defined in terms of legal art, and between interpreting a Commerce
Clause whose meaning has changed through judicial interpretation over time
and a static Commerce Clause that always must be read to reflect "the very
principle of separate state sovereignty." 136
A majority of the Justices protests far too much as they insist that
responsibility for what they are doing is not really theirs. Cognitive dissonance
echoes through the opinions we have considered. With constitutional or
statutory rulings, or interpretations of lawyers' law or the broad outlines of
federalism, this Court can be counted on to insist on its own power and to give
little attention to what legislators, administrators, or other judges have had to
say. The Justices nurture their own categorical imperatives. 137
Louise Weinberg and others have demonstrated powerfully that Justice
Holmes, and the Court he had recently joined, perpetrated an outrage a century
ago. Through Holmes, the Court denied it had equity power to do anything
about Jim Crow except to send anyone who complained about
disfranchisement back to the outrageous Alabama political process itself.
138
And we can find many additional sobering reasons to be skeptical of Holmes's
vaunted judicial restraint. 139 Nonetheless, at least Holmes seemed to strive to
35 Bush v. Gore may be the most obvious paradigm for the Court's lack of respect for a
state judiciary, but a majority of the Court also recently protected states from themselves,
for example, in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Though "[t]he National
Association of Attorneys General supported the [Violence Against Women Act of 1994]
unanimously.... and Attorneys General from 38 States urged Congress to enact the Civil
Rights Remedy," id. at 653 (Souter, J., dissenting), Chief Justice Rehnquist insisted that
federalism concerns required invalidation of the Act. Former New Hampshire Attorney
General Souter pointed out that thirty-six states and Puerto Rico filed an amicus brief urging
that the Act be upheld, and only one state supported the counter argument. See id. at 654.
Thus, Souter proclaimed, "the States will be forced to enjoy the new federalism whether
they want it or not." Id.
136 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997). See also, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 748 (1999) ("We look both to the essential principles of federalism and to the
special role of the state courts in the constitutional design.")
137 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the
Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 654 (2001) (stating that "[flrom the 1920s forward, Justices have
articulated federal constitutional norms regarding families"). The problem, however, is
even deeper than the invasion of this private sphere.
138 Louise Weinberg, Holmes' Failure, 96 MICH. L. REv. 691, 710 (1997) (discussing
Holmes's tragic limitation in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) in rejecting the
intersection of law, equity, and morals by refusing to intervene to protect the right of blacks
to vote).
139 See, e.g., AL ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES (2000); David Luban, Justice
Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L.J. 449, 453 (1994) (arguing
that Holmes' judicial restraint emerged from his own flawed personal philosophies and that
"to the extent that the classical conception of judicial self-restraint relies on Holmes as one
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be consistent most of the time, to believe that the ideal "society of jobbists"
would be "free to be egoists or altruists on the usual Saturday half holiday
provided they were neither while on the job."' 40 Today's Court all too often
seems to seek the opposite extreme, all the while denying that the will of the
Justices has anything to do with their imposition of metafederal courts on all
other public decision-makers. Their opinions seem almost an attempt to
"'make the propaganda' to publicize their 'beautiful Idea,""' 4' an effort akin to
one of the central motifs within the anarchist movement.
Some might think that what my small sample yields does not differ much
from the Supreme Court's "business as usual." The most obvious challenge
concerns a comparison to the activism of the Warren Court. But the Warren
Court was much more concerned with candor, 142 consistency,1 43 restraint in
order to respect the other branches of the national government (and often the
states as well), 144 seriousness about striving to treat like cases alike, 145 and
of its historical props, it is a weak conception"); Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A
Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 3, 254 (1962-63); Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting
Opinion-The Speech Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1349 (1984); Saul Touster, Holmes a
Hundred Years Ago: The Common Law and Legal Theory, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 673 (1982).
A vivid, relatively unknown case in point may be found in Holmes's dissent to the
application of the Thirteenth Amendment in the context of involuntary servitude in Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), discussed in Soifer, Paradox of Paternalism, supra note 38,
at 271-73.
140 Letter from Oliver W. Holmes, Jr. to Dr. John C.H. Wu (March 26, 1925), in JUSTICE
HOLMES TO DOCTOR Wu: AN INTIMATE CORRESPONDENCE, 1921-1932, 27 (1947).
141 AVRICH, supra note 10, at 52-53.
142 See, for example, Brown v. Board of Education, in which Chief Justice Warren's
opinion condemning segregated schools conceded that the unanimous Court "cannot turn
the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896
when Plessy v. Ferguson was written." 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954). In Harper v. Virginia
State Board of Elections, Justice Douglas's majority opinion striking down the poll tax
proclaimed that "the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a
particular era.... Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of [equal
protection] do change." 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (emphasis in original).
143 In McGowan v. Maryland, for example, Warren wrote for a unanimous Court,
rejecting the claim that the exemption of certain business from Maryland's Sunday Closing
Law violated equal protection. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The Warren Court may have disliked
many of the results, but it was committed to the idea that rational relationship review was to
be extremely deferential. See id. at 425 ("Although no precise formula has been developed,
the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of
discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others.");
see also, e.g., McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 808 (1969) (rejecting
equal protection claim for not extending absentee voting privileges to ballots by qualified
Cook County voters imprisoned while awaiting trial).
14 This was true in the realm of Congress's remedial power. See, e.g., Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 647 (1966) (upholding provision of 1965 Voting Rights Act that
allowed Spanish-speaking voters educated in Puerto Rico to cast ballots in New York state
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attention to the pragmatic consequences of judicial decisions.146
In comparing the two eras, the distinction in judicial approaches seems
overwhelmingly to be a difference in kind, not merely a difference in degree.
To page through any volume of the U.S. Reports from the 1950s and 1960s-
no matter what one thinks of the results-is to sense a much greater concern
with judicial craft than one finds today. To be sure, there are major
institutional differences-though not in the burden of the numbers of cases
decided each Term147-and differences in the types of cases, in the
backgrounds of the Justices, in the increased number of law clerks, and so
forth. But the fundamental difference in craftsmanship remains alarmingly
stark.
It is intriguing and deeply troubling that the public doesn't seem to know or
care. In keeping with Clifford Geertz's observation earlier in the year, what
really seems to matter is velocity and volume. 148 Thus we learn that George
elections); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315-16 (1966) (upholding
innovative congressional remedies imposed under 1965 Voting Rights Act). It was also
true, however, in the Court's frequent reluctance to condemn state laws. See, e.g., Lassiter
v. Northhampton County Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959) (unanimously upholding
literacy test for voting in North Carolina). Even when Warren, at the end of his tenure,
wrote the Court's opinion compelling the House of Representatives to seat Representative
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., he showed serious concern about institutional bona fides that
contrasts sharply with the decisions I have described. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486 (1969),
145 In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., for example, Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court
dusted off the 1866 Civil Rights Act to support the majority's point that "[alt the very least,
the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the Thirteenth Amendment
includes the freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever a
white man can live." 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968) (holding that U.S.C. § 1982 bars private
racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property and that the statute is a valid exercise
of Congress' power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute, though it formally affected
whites and blacks equally); Green v. New Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 440 (1968)
(striking down "freedom of choice" plan that failed to eliminate racial discrimination in
education "root and branch"). See generally James O'Fallon, Adjudication and Contested
Concepts: The Case of Equal Protection, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 19 (1979).
146 The classic example, very possibly counterproductive yet quite clearly concerned
with practical implementation issues, is the remedial opinion, Brown v. Board of Education
II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (instructing district court judges to enter orders necessary to
implement Brown "with all deliberate speed").
147 The number of decisions has declined precipitously in recent years. The total of
seventy-six plenary review decisions in the Court's 1999 Term, for example, was the lowest
in half a century, and less than half the number of the Court's plenary decisions in its 1972
Term. See generally Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme
Court's Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 737 (2001) (analyzing the decrease in the
size of the Court's docket).
148 See Clifford Geertz, Life Among the Anthros, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Feb. 8, 2001, at
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W. Bush quickly and vehemently denied reports that Bush told his friends that
he had been chosen by God to lead the international fight against terrorism.
"It's not true," Bush told Newsweek. "I think God sustains us, but I don't think
I was chosen. I was chosen by the American people."149  Bush v. Gore
disappears.
In the first year after the decision, reported opinions at all judicial levels
cited Bush v. Gore only twenty-nine times.150 Generally the citations were
merely part of a "string cite." The most intriguing discussion of the case,
however, came from a federal magistrate judge in New Hampshire in August,
2001.
In Walker v. Exeter Region Cooperative School District,15 1 Judge Muirhead
had to decide whether a recent change in New Hampshire election law violated
equal protection. Until a 1999 amendment changed the supermajority required
to approve a school bond issue, approval of such a measure required a two-
thirds vote within each New Hampshire town. In 1999, however, the New
Hampshire legislature lowered the required supermajority to sixty percent in
those towns that had adopted official ballot voting procedures, while leaving
the requirement at sixty-six and two-thirds percent in those towns that retained
a town meeting voting procedure. 52 The plaintiffs in the lawsuit lived in
towns that had approved bond issues by more than sixty percent but less than
sixty-six and two-thirds percent; they opposed such approvals and claimed
two different supermajority requirements violated equal protection, citing Bush
v. Gore.
Judge Muirhead dismissed their claims, holding that "uniformity among a
state's local subdivisions is not a constitutional requisite"' 153 because the
residents were not similarly situated in terms of equal protection analysis.
Muirhead carefully distinguished several recent New Hampshire Supreme
Court decisions-including an extremely controversial one about statewide
school financing-that might be read to support the federal equal protection
18 (noting the life-accelerating effect of cyberspace, and stating in the context of a fierce
academic dispute that "it is velocity that matters. Velocity and volume").
149 Howard Fineman & Martha Brant, The Bushes in Wartime, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 3, 2001,
at 29.
150 Based on a LEXIS "Shepardize" search, last checked on December 18, 2001.
1 157 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159 (D.N.H. 2001) (holding that it was not a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause for New Hampshire to impose different voting requirements upon
different school districts using different voting procedures).
152 Judge Muirhead accepted for purposes of his ruling that the legislative history
revealed an effort to make it easier to gain approval for school bonds, because the
Legislature believed that voters opposing such measures had gained increased influence in
ballot procedure towns. Id. at 158 ("The legislative history of the amendment reveals that
the Legislature's purpose was to reduce the influence of voters opposing bond issues in
official ballot districts where, the legislators believed, it had become more difficult to obtain
bond issue approval.").
153 Id. at 159.
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claims. And he also explained that in Bush v. Gore, "the Supreme Court was
cautious to limit its ruling in that case to the circumstances before it."' 154
"Therefore," said Judge Muirhead, "its applicability to this or any other case
involving concerns over voting rights and equal protection is dubious." 155
As a precedent in the first presidential primary state-the land of "Live Free
or Die"-Bush v. Gore thus seemed to expire with a whimper, not a bang.
Such a short life may be fitting, but it also satisfies the current United States
Supreme Court's general result-orientation. Bush v. Gore begins to seem like
only one of many slashes in the Court's ongoing anarchic arrogation of
authority. Despite much posturing by the Justices about the importance of
neutrality, their metafederal courts approach turns out to entail one startling
innovation after another. The current Court simply blows away the usual rules.
Perhaps emboldened by Bush v. Gore,156 the Court now points its fickle
finger of fiat in new directions. Without appreciation of paradox-and
apparently bereft of the ability to function comfortably within paradoxical
situations-a majority of the Justices seems to mistake proclaiming and then
choosing between false dichotomies for orderly legal process. The Court's
own power to order has become a substitute for careful, contextual weighing of
law and equities. Indeed, the Justices have begun to appear to be cynics when
it comes to the rule of law.
1' id., citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) ("Our consideration is limited to the
present circumstances").
55 Id. Judge Muirhead stated further that "numerous commentators and law professors
have criticized the decision for its usurpation of state court power and its unjustifiable
expansion of the Equal Protection Clause," but he decided that it was unnecessary to address
"[w]hether the court was in fact guided more by personal preferences than by sound legal
principles." Id.
"I There has been some speculation about whether the Court will be more cautious in the
wake of the public criticism of Bush v. Gore. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, Curious
Fallout From Bush v. Gore, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at A15 (commenting on the
unexpectedness of Bush v. Gore, and wondering if Justices would be pushed toward centrist
positions because of the public opinion fallout). Unfortunately, it is not implausible that the
public's acceptance and/or forgetfulness might actually encourage the Court.
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